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The Effects of Taxation on Income-Producing Crimes with Variable
Leisure Time
Avraham D. Tabbach∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The existing literature on the effects of taxation on income-producing crimes lays
claim to several important implications: first, that a pure income tax regime maintains the
(efficient) level of crime with respect to risk neutral offenders (Png and Zolt (1989), Zolt
(1989), Polinsky and Shavell (1998), Tabbach (2003)); second, that a tax regime such as
the current U.S. income tax laws under which legal and criminal income are taxable but
fines are nondeductible reduces criminal activities unambiguously (Png and Zolt (1989)),
Zolt (1989), Tabbach (2003)); third, that a shift from a pure income tax to the current
U.S. income tax laws will also reduce crime (Png and Zolt (1989), Zolt (1989), Tabbach
(2003)).1 The papers obtaining these results assume either explicitly or implicitly that the
amount of time offenders devote to leisure activities is fixed, so the choice they face is
strictly between legal and criminal income-producing activities.2 The aim of this note is
to examine the robustness of these results when leisure time can vary.3 This is of interest
because the assumption that leisure time is fixed is unrealistic and restrictive. Moreover,
the disregard of the labor-leisure choice seems particularly odd when taxation is
considered given that the criminal choice problem is constructed as a labor supply, timeallocation decision under uncertainty. As is well known, the key insights from models of
taxation and labor supply hinge on the effects of taxation on the labor-leisure choice.4
Thus, analyzing the effects of taxation on income-producing crimes while assuming that
leisure time is predetermined sheds doubt on the claims made.
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1
The latter two claims are obtained regardless of offenders’ aversion or indifference to risk.
2
See Tabbach (2003). In Png and Zolt (1989), Zolt (1989), and in Polinsky and Shavell (1998) the
assumption that taxation does not affect the level of production is implicit and it is equivalent to assuming
leisure time is fixed. Note that Hillman and Katz (1984) account for variable leisure time but their analysis
does not deal with the effects on crime of a pure income tax regime or the current U.S. income tax laws, but
only with a tax imposed solely on legal activities.
3
Similar steps are taken with respect to the basic tax evasion model, see Andersen (1977), Baldry (1979),
Pencavel (1979) and in the taxation and risk taking literature, see, for example, Cowell (1981).
4
See, for example, Hausman (1985).
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Although allowing leisure time to vary adds more realism to the model, it is not
without costs. In general, unless some strong restrictions are imposed on the utility
function, the effects of taxation on crime become more complex and the results more
ambiguous. This occurs because variable leisure time adds to the analysis two wellknown tax effects. On the one hand, taxation reduces time allocated to both legal and
criminal activities because it makes leisure relatively cheaper than market activities
(substitution effect). On the other hand, because taxation reduces wealth, it increases time
allocated to market activities as long as leisure is a normal good (income effect). If,
however, offenders are assumed to be risk neutral and the utility function is assumed to
be separable, then the income effects essentially disappear and unambiguous results
emerge. A pure income tax regime then will reduce both legal and criminal activities
unambiguously, while the current U.S. income tax laws will reduce crime, but they will
have an ambiguous effect on work. In addition, a shift from a pure income tax regime to
the current U.S. income tax laws will have its expected effect of reducing crime.
The note proceeds as follows. Section II develops the model of taxation and crime
with variable leisure time. Section III examines the effects of different income tax
regimes on legal and criminal activities. Section IV concludes.
II. THE MODEL
To analyze the effects of taxation on crime while allowing leisure time to vary,
the model found in Tabbach (2003) is employed but modified to include leisure time as
an argument in the utility function. Following Schmidt and Witte (1984), it is assumed
that there is no disutility associated with either legal or criminal activities, aside for the
reduction in leisure time. Assume then that individuals optimally allocate their time
between three activities: crime, work, and leisure, at the beginning of a given period. A
fraction a of a total amount of time T , normalized to one, is allocated to criminal
activities, a fraction b to legal activities, and the remainder, a fraction 1 − a − b to
leisure, where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 . The after-tax returns from legal activities are
safe

in

the

sense

that

they

are

given

with

certainty

by

the

function

W (b, t ) = (1 − t ) w(b) , where t is the proportional tax in place. These returns are
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assumed to be marginally decreasing with time allocated to legal activities, so Wb > 0
and Wbb < 0 , where as usual subscripts indicate partial derivatives. The after-tax returns
from crime, on the other hand, are risky in the sense that they are conditional upon two
states of the world: punishment at the end of the period with (subjective) probability p ,
and non-punishment, with (subjective) probability 1 − p , where p is constant and

exogenously determined.5 If successful, offenders receive the after-tax returns from their
crime that take a monetary or monetary-like form, and are given by the function

C (a, t ) = (1 − t )c(a ) , assumed to be marginally decreasing with time allocated to
criminal activities so Ca > 0 and Caa < 0 . If offenders are punished, the after-tax
returns from crime are reduced by an after-tax fine, given by the function

F (a,δ , t ) = (1 − δt ) f (a ) , where δ ( 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 ) is the degree of deductibility of fines.
This after-tax fine is assumed to exhibit increasing marginal severity, so Fa > 0 and

Faa > 0 . It is also assumed that individuals have initial wealth, W 0 , that is sufficient to
pay any amount of fines.6
Assuming full compliance with the tax laws and that revenues from taxation are
used to finance government spending that enters the utility function in a separable way,7
the criminal choice problem is to choose a and b that maximize expected utility:
(1)

E[U (W , L)] = (1 − p)U ( X , L) + pU (Y , L) .

Where:
(2)

Y = W 0 + W (b, t ) + C (a, t ) − F (a, t,δ )
X = W 0 + W (b, t ) + C (a,t )

5

See generally Schmidt and Witte (1984). See also Png and Zolt (1989).
This assumption is required to rule out the need to resort to nonmonetary sanctions, namely,
imprisonment.
7
See Tabbach (2003)
6

4

are terminal wealth at the end of the period given punishment and non-punishment
respectively, L = 1 − a − b is the time allocated to leisure activities, and U (W , L) is the
individual’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function defined over wealth and leisure.
It is assumed that UW > 0 , UWW = 0 or UWW < 0 , implying risk neutrality or risk
aversion respectively, and U L > 0 , U LL < 0 , implying decreasing marginal utility of
leisure. It is also assumed that U LW = 0 , which means that the rate at which the
marginal utility of leisure changes is independent of wealth and vice versa. This strong
assumption amounts to assuming “separability”. As will be shown, without this
restriction, no comparative static result of any interest appears unambiguous. The first
order conditions for a local maximum (assuming positive values for all three variables

a , b , and L ) are:
(3)

Ha =

∂EU
= (1 − p)[UX ( X , L)Ca −UL ( X , L)] +
∂a

+ p[UY (Y , L)(Ca − Fa ) −UL (Y , L)] = 0
(4)

Hb =

∂EU
= (1 − p)[U X ( X , L)Wb − U L ( X , L)] +
∂b

+ p[UY (Y , L)Wb −UL (Y , L)] = 0
These first order conditions imply that in equilibrium offenders choose the optimal a and

b , denoted, a * and b * , simultaneously, so that the net after-tax marginal returns to
time spent in legal and criminal activities is zero. These net after-tax marginal returns
include the marginal disutility of decreasing leisure time, which in turn depends on both

a and b . For risk neutrality and separability, these first order conditions reduce to:
(3’)

Ha = UX ( X , L)(Ca − pFa ) −UL ( X , L) = 0

(4’)

Hb = U X ( X , L)Wb − U L ( X , L) = 0

Which also imply that8:
8

Note that (5) holds by virtue of risk neutrality alone.
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(5)

Ca − pFa = Wb

It is assumed throughout that the parameters of the model take on values that result in an
interior solution.9
III. COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS
A. The Effects on Crime of a Pure Income Tax Regime

Examine first the effects on crime of a pure income tax regime—a tax regime
under which legal and criminal income are taxable and fines are fully deductible—for
risk neutral offenders. Such a regime is captured by setting

δ = 1 , so expected wealth

becomes:
(6)

EW = W 0 + (1 − t )( w(b) + c(a ) − pf (a ))

The effects on crime of imposing a pure income tax regime or of increasing tax rates
under such a regime can be investigated by differentiating the first order conditions (3’)
and (4’), understood to hold for

δ = 1 , with respect to t and solving for

∂a *
. We
∂t

obtain:

(7)

∂H a 
∂H b
∂a * 1 
−
=
H
H
ba
bb
∂t 
∂t
∂t
H 

Where:
H aa H ba

(8)

H =
H ab H bb

9

The second order conditions are satisfied by assuming decreasing marginal returns from legal and
criminal activities, increasing marginal severity of punishment, decreasing marginal utility of leisure, and
risk neutrality or risk aversion with income. See also discussion below.
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The second order conditions for a local maximum imply that H > 0 , H bb < 0 , and

H aa < 0 . However, to determine the sign of
H ba , H bb ,

∂a *
requires knowledge of the values of
∂t

∂H b
∂H a
, and
. Direct calculations of these terms yields:
∂t
∂t

(9)

Hba = ULL( X , L) < 0 ,

(10)

Hbb = UX ( X , L)(1− t)2 w' ' (b) +ULL( X , L) < 0 ,

(11)

∂H b
= −U X ( X , L)(1 − t ) w' (b) < 0 ,
∂t

and
(12)

∂H a
= −U X ( X , L)(1 − t )(c' (a ) − pf ' (a )) < 0 .
∂t

Inserting these terms back to (7) yields:

(13)

∂a * (U X ( X , L)) 2 (1 − t ) 2 (c' (a ) − pf ' (a ))w' ' (b)
=
<0
∂t
H

which implies that a pure income tax regime reduces crime. The economic explanation of
this result is simple. Because the relative expected returns from legal and criminal
activities are not altered by a pure income tax regime, there is no substitution effect
between legal and criminal activities. In addition, the risk effects of a pure income tax or
its effects on the willingness of offenders to bear risk are irrelevant for risk neutral
offenders.10 Moreover, because of risk neutrality and separability, the changes in wealth
associated with taxation do not affect the demand for legal, criminal, or leisure activities.
The only effect that a pure income tax regime creates is a substitution effect between
leisure and income-producing activities due to the fact that leisure is not taxed. This
substitution effect leads to a reduction in time allocated to both legal and criminal
activities and, therefore, to a reduction in the level of crime, as indicated by (13).11
10
11

On these effects see Tabbach (2003).
The explicit effect of a pure income tax on legal activities is given in equation (B2) in appendix B.
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It is important to note that this result critically depends on the assumption of
separability and risk neutrality.12 If, for example, we assume that U LW > 0 , which
amounts to assuming that the marginal utility of leisure is increasing with income and
vice versa, or, in other words, that the richer you become the more you value leisure at
the margin, while maintaining the assumption of risk neutrality, (13) becomes (see
appendix A):

(13’)

∂a * − U X ( X , L)(1 − t ) 2 w' ' (b) ∂H a
=
H
∂t
∂t

Because

∂a *
∂H a
cannot be signed (see appendix A), neither can
.
∂t
∂t

The reason why the effects of a pure income tax regime on risk neutral offenders
become ambiguous once the assumption of separability is dropped for the assumption

U LW > 0 is rather simple. Now, in addition to the substitution effect between leisure
and income-producing activities, there is also an income effect in play: taxation makes
offenders, at least in expected terms, poorer. This income effect reduces the demand for
leisure and therefore increases the demand for legal and criminal activities to the extent
that leisure is a normal good, which is guaranteed by the assumption U LW > 0 .
As shown, a pure income tax regime does not maintain the absolute level of legal
and criminal activities for risk neutral offenders when leisure time can vary. Seemingly, a
pure income tax regime will maintain the relative level of legal and criminal activities,
that is, the proportion

a*
, because the relative expected returns from legal and criminal
b*

activities are not altered. This, however, is true in only the unlikely event that the ratio of
the rates at which the expected marginal returns from legal and criminal activities change
equals the ratio of the optimal time allocation between criminal and legal activities. That
is, where (see appendix B):
12

With respect to risk aversion, Tabbach (2003) shows that a pure income tax regime results in
indeterminacy even when leisure time is predetermined due to conflicting risk and income effects.
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(14)

w' ' (b*)
a*
=
c' ' (a*) − pf ' ' (a*) b *

If the former ratio is greater (smaller) than the latter ratio, then the relative time allocated
to criminal activities will increase (decrease) and correspondently the relative time
allocated to legal activities will decrease (increase).
The economic explanation of these results is as follows: after the imposition of a
pure income tax regime, the new equilibrium still requires that the expected marginal
returns from legal and criminal activities will be equal, but this equality takes place for a
higher value (because taxation reduces the marginal utility from market activities). Thus,
the relative change in the optimal allocation of time between criminal and legal activities
will depend on the rate at which the expected marginal returns from legal and criminal
activities change, and it will remain the same only if that ratio equals the ratio of the
optimal time allocation between criminal and legal activities, as indicated in (14).
B. The Effects on Crime of Taxing Legal and Criminal Income and Disallowing
Deductions for Fines
Consider next a tax regime such as the current U.S. income tax laws under which
legal and criminal income are taxable but fines are nondeductible.13 This regime is
captured by setting
(15)

δ = 0 , so terminal wealth becomes:

Y = W 0 + (1 − t )( w(b) + c(a )) − f (a )
X = W 0 + (1 − t )( w(b) + c(a ))

The response of offenders to imposing (or increasing tax rates under) such a tax regime
can be investigated by differentiating the first order condition (3’) and (4’), understood to

13

See James v. United States 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (taxable income accrues if the taxpayer acquires
earnings, lawfully or unlawfully, without the consensual recognition, express or implied, of an obligation to
repay and without restriction as to their disposition) and section 162(f) of the Internal Revenue Code (2003)
(“no deduction shall be allowed…for any fine or similar penalty paid to the government for the violation of
any law”), which codified the decision in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
See also generally Tabbach (2003A).
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hold for

δ = 0 , with respect to t and solving for

∂a *
. We obtain (7), where now in
∂t

addition to (8), (9) and (10) we have:

(16)

∂H b
= −U X ( X , L) w' (b) < 0
∂t

and
(17)

∂H a
= −U X ( X , L)c' (a ) < 0
∂t

Inserting these terms to (7) yields:

(18)

∂a * (UX ( X , L))2 (1− t)2 w' ' (b)c' (a) ULL( X , L)(c' (a) − w' (b))
=
+
<0
∂t
H
H

The economic interpretation of this result is also simple. Imposing a tax regime that
disallows deductions for fines creates two substitution effects. It reduces the expected
returns from criminal activities proportionally more than it reduces the returns from legal
activities, thus inducing offenders to substitute work for crime. In addition, the tax
reduces the relative price of leisure, thus inducing offenders to substitute also leisure for
crime (and work). These two substitution effects imply then that a tax regime that
disallows deductions for fines will reduce crime.14 As can be expected, this result also
depends upon the assumption of separability (see appendix C). The reason again is
simple. Assuming U LW > 0 implies that leisure is a normal good, so taxation generates
an income effect as well that operates to reduce the demand for leisure and increase the
demand for legal and criminal activities. This income effect works in the opposite
direction to the substitution effects discussed above, so the net result is indeterminate.
This result also depends upon the assumption of risk neutrality (see appendix D). The
reason is similar, but a little bit more complicated. Because of separability, the income
effect generated by taxation does not affect the marginal utility of leisure. However, even

14

The effect of such a tax regime on legal activities, however, is ambiguous because the two substitution
effects are conflicting.
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ignoring its effects on the willingness of offenders to bear risk and other potential effects,
the income effect increases the marginal utility of income – assuming the utility function
is concave with respect to income – thus increasing the marginal utility of market
activities. This increase means that the demand for legal and criminal activities will rise.
Under separability and risk aversion (with constant absolute risk aversion), the income
effect works again in opposite direction to the substitution effects, so the net effect is still
indeterminate.15
C. The Effects on Crime of Changes in the Degree of Deductibility

δ (Punishment)

Lastly, analyze the effects on crime of switching from a deductibility regime to a
nondeductibility regime, which amounts to analyzing the effects on crime of changes in
the degree of deductibility
(19)

δ . Terminal wealth for some positive δ becomes:

Y = W 0 + (1 − t )( w(b) + c(a )) − (1 − δt ) f (a )
X = W 0 + (1 − t )( w(b) + c(a ))

Differentiating the first order conditions (3’) and (4’), understood to hold for 0 < δ < 1 ,
with respect to

(20)

δ and solving for

∂a *
, we obtain:
∂δ

∂H b
∂H a 
∂a * 1 
=
−
H
H
ba
bb
∂δ
∂δ
∂δ 
H 

Where now:
(21)

∂H b
=0.
∂δ

15

It should be noted that if the multi-attribute absolute risk aversion function is decreasing, the income
effect with respect to criminal activities itself becomes ambiguous. On the one hand, the reduction in the
level of wealth increases the marginal utility of market activities, leading to an increase in the demand for
crime. On the other hand, the (equal) reduction in the level of wealth reduces the willingness of offenders
to bear risk, thus reducing the demand for crime. Disregarding other possible effects, these two effects
alone operate in opposite directions, so the net income effect is ambiguous.
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(22)

∂H a
= pU X ( X , L)tf ' (a ) > 0
∂δ

The second order conditions for a local maximum imply that H > 0 and H bb < 0 , so
we can conclude that

∂a *
> 0.
∂δ

The economic explanation for this result is similar to the one given above and need not be
repeated here. Somewhat surprisingly, this result also depends on separability and risk
neutrality (unless the uncommon assumption of constant or increasing absolute risk
aversion is adopted). If we assume that U LW > 0 , while maintaining risk neutrality,
then:

(20’)

∂H b
= − pU LY (Y , L)tf (a ) < 0
∂δ

(21’)

∂H a
= pU X ( X , L)tf ' (a ) − pU LY (Y , L)tf (a )
∂δ

Because

negative),

∂H a
cannot be signed (the first term is positive while the second term is
∂δ

∂a *
∂H a
cannot be signed either. If, however,
≥ 0 , which follows if
∂δ
∂δ

∂a *
UY (Y , L)
f (a )
> 0 . If,
≥
, then because H ba , H bb < 0 , we can conclude that
∂δ
UYL (Y , L) f ' (a )
on the other hand,

∂a *
U (Y , L)
f (a )
∂H a
< 0 , which follows if Y
<
, then
will be
∂δ
∂δ
UYL (Y , L) f ' (a )

indeterminate.
If we relax the assumption of risk neutrality and assume instead risk aversion,
while maintaining the assumption of separability, then, in addition to H bb < 0 :
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(22)

∂H a
= pUYY (Y , L)((1 − t )c' (a ) − (1 − δt ) f ' (a ))tf (a )
∂δ
+ pUY (Y , L)tf ' (a ) > 0

(23)

∂H b
= pUYY (Y , L)(1 − t ) w' (b)tf (a ) < 0
∂δ

but,
(24)

Hba = (1 − p)UXX ( X , L)(1 − t)2 c' (a)w' (b) +

+ pUYY (Y , L)((1 − t)c' (a) − (1 − δt) f ' (a))(1 − t)w' (b) + ULL( X , L)
is not signed. It is apparent that if H ba < 0 , then

∂a *
∂a *
> 0 , but that otherwise
∂δ
∂δ

cannot be signed. H ba is negative, however, only if the multi-attribute function of
absolute risk aversion is constant or increasing with income (see appendix E). One can
conclude then that for risk aversion and separability a shift from a deductibilty regime to
a nondeductibility regime will reduce crime unambiguously only if offenders exhibit
constant or increasing absolute risk aversion. If, however, the common assumption of
decreasing absolute risk aversion is employed, the effects of changes in the degree of
deductibility cannot be unambiguously determined.
IV. CONCLUSION
The aim of this note has been to examine the effects on crime of income taxation
when the amount of time allocated to leisure is variable. The results show that unless
strong restrictions are placed on the utility function—in particular that offenders exhibit
risk neutrality and that the utility function is separable—no clear results can be obtained.
In particular, in contrast to previous results, a pure income tax regime no longer
maintains the (efficient) level of crime with respect to risk neutral offenders. Similarly,
the current U.S. income tax laws no longer reduce crime unambiguously. Moreover, even
the effects on crime of a shift from a deductibility regime to a nondeductibility regime (at
least for small values of tax rates) are no longer unambiguously determined. This occurs
13

because with variable leisure time taxation, on the one hand, reduces time allocated to
both legal and criminal activities as leisure time becomes relatively cheaper than market
activities, but, on the other hand, it increases time allocated to market activities as long as
leisure is a normal good. If offenders exhibit risk neutrality and the utility function is
separable, then the income effects essentially disappear and the results become clear. A
pure income tax regime and the current U.S. income tax laws then will reduce crime
unambiguously, and so will a shift from a deductibility regime to a nondeductibility
regime.
The indeterminacy associated with variable leisure time is not surprising. In part,
it is similar to indeterminacies obtained in the work of Hillman and Katz (1984) and in
the tax evasion literature when the labor-supply decision is endogenous.16 This
indeterminacy, however, strongly suggests the importance of empirical work that would
guide policymakers in deciding between different tax regimes and between different
levels of monetary sanctions and tax rates.
It is worth emphasizing, lastly, that leisure activities include both legal and
criminal non-market activities. Therefore, an increase (decrease) in leisure time does not
necessarily mean a decrease (increase) in the level of criminal activities in general, but
rather a potential decrease (increase) in the level of income-producing crimes.
APPENDIX A
To derive (13’), insert to (7) the following terms (calculated for risk neutrality and

U LW > 0 ):
(A1)

Hbb = UX ( X , L)(1− t)2 w' ' (b) −UXL( X , L)(1− t)w' (b)

− (1− p)UXL( X , L)(1− t)w' (b) − pUYL(Y , L)(1− t)w' (b)
+ (1− p)ULL( X , L) + pULL(Y , L) < 0
16

See, for example, Andersen (1977), Baldry (1977), Pencavel (1979).
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(A2)

Hab = −UXL( X , L)(1− t)(c' (a) − pf ' (a))
− (1− p)UXL( X , L)(1− t)w' (b) − pULY (Y , L)(1− t)w' (b)
+ (1− p)ULL( X , L) + pULL(Y , L) < 0

(A3)

∂H b
= −U X ( X , L) w' (b) + (1 − p )U XL ( X , L)( w(b) + c(a ))
∂t
pUYL ( X , L)( w(b) + c(a ) − f (a ))

(A4)

∂H a
= −U X ( X , L)(c' (a ) − pf ' (a ))
∂t
+ (1 − p)U XL ( X , L)( w(b) + c(a )) + pUYL (Y , L)( w(b) + c(a ) − f (a ))

It is apparent that

∂H a
cannot be signed because the first term is negative, the second
∂t

term is positive, and the third term can be negative, zero, or positive, depending on
whether w(b) + c(a ) − f (a ) ≤≥ 0 .
APPENDIX B
A pure income tax regime will have no effect on the relative time allocation between
legal and criminal activities if:

∂
(B1)

a*
b*
a*
∂ b * −∂ a *
b* = t
t
= 0,
2
∂t
b*

which implies that:

a*
t = a*
(B1’)
b* b*
∂
t
∂

Where:
15

(13)

(B2)

∂a * (U X ( X , L)) 2 (1 − t ) 2 (c' (a ) − pf ' (a ))w' ' (b)
=
<0 ,
∂t
H
∂b *
∂t

=

(U X ( X , L)) 2 (1 − t ) 2 ( c' ' ( a ) − pf ' ' ( a )) w' (b)
H

<0

Inserting these terms back to (B1’) we obtain (14).17
APPENDIX C
We examine the characteristics of

(7)

∂H a 
∂H b
∂a * 1 
−
=
H
H
ba
bb
∂t 
∂t
∂t
H 

for the case of risk neutrality and U LW > 0 , assuming a tax regime with no deductions

∂H

b , and
for fines is in place. Direct calculation of H ba , H bb ,
∂t

∂H a
yields:
∂t

(C1)

Hab = −UXL( X , L)((1− t)c' (a) − pf ' (a)) + G < 0

(C2)

Hbb = UX ( X , L)(1− t)2 w' ' (b) −UXL( X , L)(1− t)w' (b) + G < 0

(C3)

∂H a
= −U X ( X , L)c' (a ) + K ( w(b) + c(a ))
∂t

(C4)

∂H b
= −U X ( X , L) w' (b) + K ( w(b) + c(a ))
∂t

Where:

G = −KWb + M < 0
K = (1− p)UXL( X , L) + pUYL(Y , L) > 0
17

The same will be true if

∂a *
∂t

and

∂b *
∂t

were calculated for U LW > 0 instead of separability.

16

M = (1− p)ULL( X , L) + pULL(Y , L) < 0
It is apparent that

∂H b
∂H a
, and
cannot be signed (the first term in each is negative
∂t
∂t

while the second term is positive), therefore it is likely that

∂a *
will not be signed
∂t

either. Inserting these terms back to (7) yields (C5):

∂a * 1
∂H
= [−UXLUX w' (b) pf ' (a) + GUX (c' (a) − w' (b)) −UX (1− t)2 w' ' (b) a ]
∂t
H
∂t
The first and second terms in the square brackets are negative. The last term, however,
depends on

∂Ha
∂a *
, which cannot be signed. Therefore,
is ambiguous.
∂t
∂t
APPENDIX D

We examine the characteristics of (7) for the case of risk aversion and separability,
assuming a tax regime with no deductions for fines is in place. By the second order
conditions for a local maximum H > 0 and H bb < 0 . Direct calculation of

∂H a
,
∂t

∂H b
, and H ba reveals, however, that none can be signed.
∂t
∂H a
= −(1 − p)U XX ( X , L)(1 − t )c' (a )( w(b) + c(a )) − (1 − p)U X ( X , L)c' (a )
∂t
− pUYY (Y , L)((1 − t )c' (a ) − f ' (a ))( w(b) + c(a )) − pUY (Y , L)c' (a )
The second, third, and forth terms are negative, but the first term is positive.

∂H b
= −(1 − p)U XX ( X , L)(1 − t ) w' (a )( w(b) + c(a )) − (1 − p)U X ( X , L) w' (a )
∂t
17

− pUYY (Y , L)(1 − t ) w' (b)( w(b) + c(a )) − pUY (Y , L) w' (a )
The first and third terms are positive, but the second and forth terms are negative.

(D3)

Hba = (1 − p)UXX ( X , L)CaWb + pUYY (Y , L)(Ca − Fa )Wb + ULL( X , L)

The first and third terms are negative, while the second term is positive.
APPENDIX E
We examine the characteristics of (D3). Using the multi-attribute absolute risk aversion

U

function R (W , L) = − WW
A

(W , L)

U (W , L)

, the first and second terms in (D3) can be

W

rewritten as:
(E1)

−Wb ((1 − p)RA( X , L)UX ( X , L)Ca + pRY (Y , L)UY (Y , L)(Ca − Fa ))

From the first order condition (3) it follows that:
(E2)

(1 − p)UX ( X , L)Ca + pUY (Y , L)(Ca − Fa ) > 0

where the first term is positive and the second term is negative.
It follows then that for R ( X , L) ≥ R (Y , L) , that is, for constant or increasing
A

A

absolute risk aversion, the terms in the brackets in (E1) are positive, so that H ba < 0 .
However, if R ( X , L) < R (Y , L) , that is, if absolute risk aversion is decreasing, then
A

A

(E1) cannot be signed, so H ba cannot be signed either.
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